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IN THE SUPREME. COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
VADA J. TOMLINSON ACOTT, REBA
TOMLINSON FULLER, RUBY TO~I
LINSON BEEBE, NORA E. TOMLINSON SCHOCKLEY, MARGUERITE
TOMLINSON CISNEY and ALTON E.
TOMLINSON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No.

8879

-vs.LESLIE A .TOMLINSON, Individually
and as Administrator of the Estate of A.
L. Tomlinson, Deceased,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents disagree with appellant's statement of
facts in such a large measure that a separate statement
followed by specific references to those statements of
appellant wherein respondents disagree will be made.
This in an action to have a trust imposed on certain
mining property and for an accounting for the proceeds
therefrom. The case turns upon the intent and effect of
certain quitclaim mining deeds given to defendant by
plaintiffs in June of 1952. However, in order to understand and interpret these deeds an understanding of the
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background and events leading up to these deeds is imperative.
Defendant is the brother of each of the plaintiffs and
all are heirs of A. L. Tomlinson, who died in 1941 (R. 2,
23). At the time of his death, A. L. Tomlinson was the
owner of some unpatented mining claims in the Temple
Mountain District of Emery County, Utah, known as the
Camp Bird Mining claims Nos. 1 to 14.
At the time of Mr. Tomlinson's death, a quiet title
action was pending in the District Court of Emery County, Civil No. 1466, the Court records of which are a part
of the record on appeal. This record discloses that although prior to his death A. L. Tomlinson ·was not a
party to the action, following his death F. B. Hammond
purporting to represent Mr. Tomlinson entered into a
stipulation whereby decedent was to receive an undivided
71;2% interest in a group of mining claims involved ]n
that action. The Camp Bird claims were not mentioned
anywhere in the files of case ~ o. 1466. The stipulation
was entered into in l\fay of 1942, some six months after
Mr. Tomlinson's death and was therefore of questionable
validity. A judgment on this stipulation was not entered
until April of 1950, almost eight years later. It appears
from the testimony that neither the plaintiffs nor the
defendant lmew of this stipulation at the time it was
entered. In 1950 defendant learned of it frmn E. G. Frawley, president of oContinental Mining and l\filling Company with whom defendant was dealing (T-1, p. 257).
Plaintiffs did not learn of the stipulation at tl1at time
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(T-1, p. 37; T-1, p ..60; T-1, p. 96; T-1, p.105; T-1, p.128;
T-1, p. 140).
On July 6, 1942, probate proceedings of the
Estate of A. L. Tomlinson were commenced. The first
administrator had done nothing with the estate whatsoever, and in 1949 he resigned and defendant was appointed on April 6, 1949. (D's Exh. 18)
Nothing of any consequence had occurred on the
property between 1942 and 1949, when uranium activity
got under way. In June of 1949, a group known as the
Hanson group, claiming ownership of some claims on
Temple Mountain, commenced a quiet title action, Civil
No. 1713, against all parties claiming any interest in
claims on Temple Mountain, including defendant as administrator of the Tomlinson estate. The Court files of
Civil No. 1713 are included as a part of the record on
appeal in this case.
In the meantime, defendant had taken possession of
the Camp Bird claims, had shipped certain ores therefrom and in the fall of 1949 entered into several leases
for the mining of these claims (D's Exh. 11, 12, 13; T-2,
p. 25,80). The court found that from these leases defendant received and deposited in bank accounts for the estate the sum of $7,329.71. The Court further found that
the royalties which accrued under these leases and from
the mining of Continental Mining and Milling Company,
as hereafter described, during 1949 and part of 1950
amounted to $13,603.64. Defendant did not attempt to
verify the amount of royalties which were due under these
shipments, nor did he take any steps to obtain an ac-
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counting from the persons shipping the ores, or do anything to collect these additional royalties (Finding No.
10, R. 80).
In addition to the royalties received, defendant obtained money and property amounting to $335.00 from
two of the lessees, which he did not deposit in the estate
accounts (T-1, p. 305; T-2, pgs. 63, 66).
In January of 1950 defendant was contacted by E.
G. Frawley who was interested in acquiring the Camp
Bird claims. He entered into a contract for the sale of
the claims for a purchase price of $25,000.00 and at least
65,000 shares of the common stock of a corporation to
which Mr. Frawley was transfering the contract. This
agreement also provided that :\Ir. Frawley would pay
all expenses then due or thereafter to become due in connection with the Tomlinson estate and would prosecute
such actions as might be necessary to clear the title to
the ·Camp Bird claims. The agreement provided defendant would obtain quitclaim deeds from the other heirs
of A. L. Tomlinson. ( Exh. A of P's Exh. 0).
In furtherance of this agreement, on January ~3.
1950, defendant wrote a letter to each of plaintiffs requesting that they execute a deed of the Camp Bird
claims to him, authorize hi1n to discharge F. B. IImnmond
as attorney for the estate and to en1plo~- counsel to prosecute any legal actions which Inight be necessary to protect the property. The letter expressly stated that he
would hold the clailns for plaintiffs' use and benefit and
would account to then1 for all n1onies and stock received
therefrom. It further provided that the~· ,,·ould not be
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charged for any expenses, past or future, in connection
with the legal work mentioned. The letter advised them
he was going to sell the claims and was to receive 56,000
[sic] shares of stock from Continental Mining and Milling
Company (P's Exh. C).
In response to defendant's request, plaintiffs executed quitclaim deeds conveying the Camp Bird claims to
defendant. Defendant admitted that he received the
claims under these deeds upon an express trust to hold
the mining claims for the use and benefit of plaintiffs
(T-1, p. 2; T-1, p. 3; T-1, p. 4; T-1, p. 5).
The contract of sale was assigned to Continental
Mining and Milling Company who assumed the obligation
thereof (P's Exh. H). On March 18, 1950, Mr. Frawley on
behalf of the company agreed to pay defendant a royalty
of 10% on ores produced by the company until defendant
had received $5,000, and the 65,000 shares of the company's stock (Exh. B of P's. Exh. 0).
In the spring of 1950, Mr. Frawley organized Consolidated Uranium Mines, Inc. (T-2, p. 203), an affiliate
and successor in interest to Continental, in both of which
Mr. Frawley was the president and C. Allen Elggren was
secretary (T-2, p. 63). On May 16, 1950, Consolidated
entered into a lease of the Temple Mountain properties
with all of the parties to the quiet title action with the
exception of defendant and a group of claimants who will
be designated the Migliaccio group. This lease is contained in the record of Civil No. 1713. It provided that
Consolidated would mine the properties and would place
a royalty of 10% in escrow in a bank to be paid out ac-
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cording to the final determination of Civil No. 1713.
Having joined hands with defendant's adversaries
by this lease, a suit was then started by Continental
against defendant in June of 1950, claiming fraud on defendant's part in the January 1950 contract of sale (P's.
Exh. H). Defendant filed no answer to this complaint
(T-1, p. 304). Rather he entered into an agreement in
July of 1950 with Continental terminating his prior
agreements with them and giving Continental an option
to purchase the ·Camp Bird claims for the cash and stock
previously agreed to be paid. In this agreement, Continental agreed to pay all of defendant's legal expenses and
claims against the estate for legal work, and also agreed
to hold defendant harmless for any claims arising out of
ores removed from the Camp Bird claims prior to May
16, 1950 (P's. Exh. 0).
On December 19, 1950, Continental authorized the
issuance to defendant of 32,500 shares of the stock of
Consolidated held in its treasury (P's. Exh. Y). Coincident with this, defendant executed a document whereby
he recognized that he claimed only a five per cent interest
in the Temple :Mountain clailns pursuant to the stipulation in Civil No. 1466, and thereby relinquished his claim
to ownership of the Camp Bird claims. This document
was executed January 12, 1951 (P's Exh. R), but defendant had agreed to it earlier (T-2. p.125). Continental
dismissed its suit against defendant on January 15,
1951 (P's Exh I).
From 1\fay, 1950 to Decmnber, 1950, defendant held
a sublease of the Camp Bird No. 12 mining claim from
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Continental and produced ores therefrom (T-1, p. 308;
T-2, p. 61-3). The Court found that he received $23,804.40
from this production and incurred expenses of $17,244.17
in connection therewith (Finding No. 29, R. 84).
The quiet title action, Civil No. 1713, continued
along without going to trial in 1951. Then, on December
15, 1951, a stipulation and agreement resolving all adverse claims between the parties except the Migliaccio
group was entered into. This agreement provided undivided interests in various claims, and gave defendant
as administrator of the Tomlinson Estate an undivided
3.53% interest in these claims which covered all of Temple Mountain. It provided that the royalty monies which
had been placed in escrow from Consolidated's operation
should be disbursed with the exception of 5% thereof
to be held for the Migliaccio group, and it waived any
claims accounting for ores theretofore removed by the
parties (P's Exh. F). The evidence of defendant was that
although the agreement was agreed to in December of
1951, it was not executed until March of 1952 (T-1, p.
222).
Pursuant to this stipulation and agreement, Therald
N. Jensen gave defendant a check for $1,077.97 about
April 15, 1952 (T-1, p. 223; P's. Exh. E). This was the
initial distribution of the escrowed funds from Consolidated's operations.
This background then brings us to June of 1952. This
material is largely documentary in character and is not
open to dispute. A recapitulation of the defendant's
status as administrator and trustee at this time is essen-
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tial in evaluating the conflict of testimony relative to the
deeds given by plaintiff's to defendant in June of 1952.
Prior to June 1952, defendant had received and
deposited from the leases of 1949-50 $7,329.71. He had
received $335.00 from lessees in side deals. He had produced ores in 1949 which gave him $560.04. He had received $1,077.97 as the initial distribution of royalties on
Consolidated's operations. He had operated a sublease
under Continental or Consolidated in 1950 which had
yielded him a profit of $6,560.23. Continental had agreed
to give him 32,500 shares of ·Consolidated stock, to pay
legal costs incurred by defendant, and to hold him harmless from any claims for ores produced prior to ~fay 16,
1950. He had entered into the stipulation and agreement
whereby he was to receive 3.53% interest in all claims
on Temple Mountain covering a much larger area than
the Camp Bird Claims, and the other parties had waived
any claims for accountings arising prior to the agreement. The Temple l\lountain litigation was at an end with
the exception of whether the l\Iigliaccio group would get
5% interest in the whole area or get seven mining claims.
In this setting, while acting as the administrator of
the estatP, and trustee under the 1950 deeds defendant
obtained fron1 his brother and sisters quitclaim deeds of
the 1nining claims covering all of Temple l\Iountain acquired in the December 15, 1951 stipulation and agreement (P's. Exh. A-1 to A-6, inclusive).
There is a sharp conflict in the evidence offered as
to the conversations had relative to these 1952 deeds.
The evidence of plaintiffs was to the effect that these
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deeds were given to defendant upon his request and
assertion that he would hold the property so conveyed
for the use and benefit of plaintiffs and would divide any
proceeds derived therefrom equally. Defendant on the
other hand testified that the deeds were given in order
to convey both the legal and equitable title to defendant,
and that defendant undertook the risk of distributing to
plaintiffs their share of their father's estate and agreed
to hold them harmless from any claims that they return
the money. The court after hearing this conflicting evidence found that defendant had represented to plaintiffs
that he would hold the property in trust for them (Finding No. 33, R. 85). Analysis of the evidence demonstrates
there was ample evidence in the record to support this
finding.
In May of 1952 defendant mailed a set of Quitclaim
Deeds to his mother for each of the plaintiffs to sign
(T-1. p. 272). Around the end of May, 1952, Mrs. Cisney
after receiving her deed had a conversation with defendant relative to the execution of the deeds. She asked him
what would happen to their interest in the claims if they
gave him the deeds. Defendant told her that if anything
was derived from the claims he would distribute this to
all the heirs equally (T-1, p. 14; T-1, p. 30; T-1, p. 32;
T-1, p. 44; T-1, p. 47). Following this conversation and
before the deeds were executed, Mrs. Cisney relayed this
information to the other plaintiffs (T-1, p. 31 to 33, incl.;
T-1, p. 77; T-1, p. 122; T-1, p. 134).
Plaintiffs' testimony was to the effect that they had
left the management and control of the affairs of the
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estate to defendant as adminstrator and trustee, and
had little personal knowledge of any of the affairs of the
estate or defendant's dealing with the property (T-1, p.
37; T-1, p. 49; T-1, p. 62; T-1, p. 105; T-1, p. 316). They
stated that when defendant requested the deeds they
were not suspicious of any ulterior motive of defendant,
and since they had previously conveyed the Camp Bird
Claims to him so he could deal with them, they believed
the deeds covering all the Temple l\Iountain claims were
needed by defendant to enable him to continue to deal
with the property. They said they had no reason to suspect he was doing anything but looking out for their
best interests (T-1, p. 30; T-1, p. 58; T-1, p. 79; T-1, p. 89;
T-1, p. 97; T-1, p. 105; T-1, p. 109; T-1, p. 132). They did
not seek advice from anyone as to whether or not they
should sign the deeds, relying on their brother and feeling
that advice was not necessary (T-1, p. 96; T-1, p. 1-±2;
T-1, p. 152; T-1, p. 154). They were trying to co-operate
with him and \vere going along \\ith the rest of the family
(T-1, p. 65; T-1, p. 48). Even defendant testified in relating a conversation relative to estate 1natters that
plaintiffs relied upon his judgment (T-1, p. 266).
At about the time the 1952 deeds were executed, each
of plaintiffs were given a check in the a1nount of $500.
This money was taken by defendant from the estate bank
account and was from royalties earned under the 1949-50
Leases. Smne of the plaintiffs testified that they did
not know of the $500 check at the ti1ne they executed the
deed (T-1, p. 55; T-1, p. 137). At the tiine the $500 payInents were n1ade to plaintiffs, defendant took a like dis-
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tribution for himself (D's. Exh. 21). None of the defendant's own money was ever given to plaintiffs (T-1, p. 324).
The testimony of defendant in this connection offers
an interesting comparison. On direct examination, defendant testified that in June of 1952 he advised plaintiffs there was about $6800 in royalty monies accumulated, and that the Camp Bird claims had been converted
into a fractional interest in the whole group of Temple
Mountain claims, (T-1, p. 273). He said plaintiffs told
him they did not care what claims he got or what money
he got, but that they felt the part of the accumulated
royalties which had been deposited to the estate account
should be distributed to them (T-1, p. 274). He said he
had previously advised plaintiffs that there were adverse
claimants and he could not distribute this money to then1
as he believed he might have to give it back as a result
of the Migliaccio group's claims in the quiet title action
(T-1, p. 277), and that in attempting to find a way to get
the money distributed, he suggested that they take thi~
money and he would take the claims and if the Migliaccio
group recovered the royalty monies he would absorb this
loss (T-1, p. 274, 277).
On cross examination it was developed that he had
paid himself an equal amount in the distribution. To this
he said the agreement reached was that he was to take
the claims, and the money in the account was to be divided equally among all of the heirs ( T -1, p. 286). He said
that it was also part of the agreement that in addition he
was to receive all of the royalty money paid to him by
Therald Jensen (T-1, p. 278), and then that the distribu-
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tion was to be made only of the money left after he had
paid off all the expenses for attorneys fees and the like
from the estate account (T-1, p. 285). Defendant later
testified the agreement was that plaintiffs were to get
$500 each and for this reason he inserted this figure into
the deeds as the consideration for them (T-1, p. 314).
Plaintiffs testified that at no time was there any
agreement that defendant was to take both the legal and
equitable title to the mining claims and they would take
only a distribution of the monies on hand in the royalty
account (T-1, p. 64; T-1, p. 75; T-1, p. 90; T-1, p. 338;
T-1, p. 339).
Plaintiffs testified and the Court found that at the time
defendant obtained the 1952 deeds he did not discuss
with plaintiffs, nor did they have knowledge of the progress being made with the estate as to when it might be
ready to be closed, the status of the quiet title action involving the property nor the existance of the 1951 stipulation and agreement, the receipt by defendant of the
royalty payn1ents frmn Therald Jensen in the anwunt of
$1077.97, the receipt of the side papnents to defendant
from the lessees in 1949-50, the receipts of defendant
from his lease operations as sublessee of Continental,
the mnount of ore produced frmn the nrining clain1s and
the interest of plaintiffs therein, the agreement for
defendant to receive the 32,500 shares of stock of Consolidated, or the value of the n1ining clain1s insofar as
then known to defendant. The Court further found these
facts were known by defendant. (Finding No. 37).
Defendant in his evidence did not offer anything
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to show that he disclosed to plaintiffs that he received
the side payments from the Lessees in 1949-50, that he
had leased the Camp Bird No. 12 claim from Continental
and mined it, nor that he had an agreement to receive the
32,500 shares of stock of Consolidated. He admitted that,
although he had been mining the property and knew of
Consolidated's operations, he did not advise plaintiffs as
to the value of the property, and, on the contrary, he
testified he had told them there was no way to determine
the value of the claims (T-1, p. 275). He further testified
that he had told plaintiffs that giving the deeds looked
like the only way a distribution of the estate money could
be made (T-1, p. 274). On cross examination, however,
he testified that there had been no change in the quiet
title action or the affairs of the estate from June 1952,
when he told plaintiffs the money could not be distributed, and February, 1953, when he in fact obtained a
decree of distribution (T-1, p. 332).
Relative to defendant's testimony that he undertook
to hold plaintiffs harmless against the possibility of
having to return the distribution made to them, an examination of the Court records in Civil No. 1713 reveals
that in June of 1952, when the deeds were obtained, the
_Migliaccio group were making no claim for damages for
ores removed from Temple Mountain whatsoever. Fur-thermore, at no time did the Migliaccio group make any
claim for damages against defendant. It is noteworthy
that until defendant gave up his claim to the Camp Bird
claims in Civil No. 1713, and recognized the fractional
interest, both he and 1\fr. Migliaccio had been represented
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by the same groups of attorneys, indicating that there
was no conflict of interest. Attention is also called to the
agreement of Continental to hold defendant harmless
against any claim for ores removed prior to May 16, 1950
( P's. Exh. 0). All of the money distributed in 1952 was
from royalties received prior to that date.
Defendant testified that following the execution of
the 1952 deeds, plaintiffs had no interest whatsoever ill
the property (T-1, p. 316). In spite of this testimony, on
.July 21, 1952, defendant, in depositing the second royalty
payment from Therald Jensen amounting to $327, made
the notation on his bank statement describing this deposit
"Royalty to Estate." (D's. Ex. 22). Plaintiff A. E. Tomlinson testified of a conversation in July of 1952 with
defendant when defendant said he needed the second
set of deeds to keep the property going for the benefit of
the estate (T-1, p. 102), and of another conversation ·with
defendant in the spring of 1954, when defendant told him
he was receiving a s1nall a1nount of royalty but not
enough to be divided at that time (T-1, p. 103).
Following the execution of the 1952 deeds, defendant
made two additional distributions to plaintiffs, the first
on July 19, 1952, a1nounting to $50, and the second Xovember 31, 1953, amounting to $42.50. A1l of these were
from the smne estate account, and as to each he paid
himself as 1nuch or 1nore than he gave plaintiffs. (Ps'.
Ex. B-1, B-2; Def. Ex. B-8, B-9, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13,
B-14, B-17, B-18; Def. Ex. 21, Def. Ex. N-7, N-4.)
On each occasion that defendant made a distribution
payment to plaintiffs, he gave a check in a like a1nount
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to his mother, Lillie M. Tomlinson (Def. Ex. B-15, B-16,
N-5).
Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, the
trial court concluded that defendant had expressly agreed
to hold the property in trust. It further concluded that
had it not been for this promise, the transaction would
have been so unfair and lacking in disclosure of material
facts that a constructive trust would have arisen.
Following the execution of the 1952 deeds, plaintiffs
testified that they assumed defendant was holding the
property for their use and benefit, and were not aware
of any contention on his part to the contrary, until November 31, 1953, when Mrs. Fuller was advised by her
mother when she was given the last check from defendant that there would be no more money coming to then1
(T-1, p. 87-89). She advised Mrs. Cisney of this (T-1, p.
52), and the two of them became apprehensive of the
situation. They contacted Stephens, Brayton & Lowe,
attorneys, who requested an accounting from defendant
(T-1, p. 281; T-1, p. 143). In May of 1954, defendant
advised plaintiffs' attorneys that he recognized no interest of plaintiffs. This was the first plaintiffs learnerl
from defendant that he did not acknowledge he was holding the property for their use and benefit, and claimed
both the legal and equitable title to the property (T-1, p.
30; T-1, p. 64; T-1, p. 84; T-1, p. 104; T-1, p. 139).
As stated above, on December 19, 1950, Continental
authorized and directed the issuance to defendant of
32,500 shares of Consolidated stock held in its treasury
(Ps'. Ex. V). In his answer defendant admits this stock
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was received as a result of transactions relating to the
property (R. 16; 24). The stock was sold by defendant
for $23,623.70 (Ps'. Ex. U). Defendant testified that he
had been employed as a carpenter and foreman by Mr.
Frawley from February to June of 1950 and had not been
paid anything for this work but ~Ir. Frawley had
promised him he would receive the stock in payment for
his work (T-1, p. 206, 207). He testified this was the
only reason for his getting the stock (T-1, p. 311).
In direct contravention to this testimony, defendant
offered the testimony of C. Allen Elggren, Secretary of
Continental, that they had paid defendant an ordinary
wage for his work, and that the stock was not given to
him for his services as carpenter or foreman (T-2, p. 210,
218).
The number of shares received by defendant -was
exactly one-half the number agreed to be given to him
under the agreements with Continental (Ps '. Ex. 0).
In view of defendant's adn1ission that the stock was
received from dealings with the property, the time at
which the stock was authorized for hi1n, and the direct
conflict in defendant's evidence explaining what the stock
was given to him for if not for his relinquishing his
claims to the Camp Bird clanns and accepting the fractional interests in the group of clanns, the Court concluded that the shares of stock were receiYed in lieu of th~
65,000 shares previously agreed to be given to him, and
as a result of his dealings with the property.
On February 10, 1953, pursuant to a petition of
defendant a Decree of Distribution in the Estate was
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signed by the Court. This recited the fact that plaintiffs had given Quitclaim Deeds to the defendant and
made distribution to defendant of all of the residue of
the estate. The trial court ruled there was nothing in
the probate proceedings which would make the plaintiffs
aware of any contention on the part of defendant as to
the equitable ownership of the claims, and that from the
probate proceedings they would be aware only that the
defendant was having distributed .to him the legal title
to the claims in the estate.
In his accounting defendant claimed credit for attorneys' fees paid to K. K. Steffensen of $525 and to C.
Allen Elggren of $200 (Def. Ex. 21, T-2, p.157; Def. Exh.
N-3). Plaintiffs contended that these were not properly
allowable in view of the agreement with ·Continental and
E. G. Frawley whereby it was agreed that these would
be paid for by Continental (Ps'. Ex. 0; Ps'. Ex. C), defendant's testimony that he made no effort to collect
these from Continental (T-2, p. 168), and the fact that
C. Allen Elggren was secretary of Continental. The court
allowed these credits.
Each of the statements contained in the foregoing
Statement of Facts is consistent with the findings of the
trial court in this action. Defendant in his statement of
facts ignores entirely that he is faced with a finding of
fact of the trial court contrary to the statements therein
contained. At no place in his brief does he contend that
the trial court was erroneous in making these finding~,
or that the findings \vere without support in the evidence.
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Rather, the statements of facts of defendant consists only
of a repetition of his position in the trial court below.
The specific statements of defendant with which respondents disagree are as follows:
1. On page 2, defendant states that in 1942 the
estate's interest in the Camp Bird claims was reduced to
TY2 % by stipulation with other locators. The stipulation
and the files of Civil No. 1466 do not mention Camp Bird
claims.
2. On page 3, defendant states that the heirs compelled the removal of the administrator of the Tomlinson
estate in February of 1949. There is nothing in the
record as to the cause of the removal other than resignation.
3. On page 3, defendant states that leases entered
into by defendant in 1949-50 provided for a royalty of
15 per cent and the Atomic Energy Commission, the only
purchaser, was advised of the lease agree1nents and all
royalty checks were paid to the estate's bank account at
Grand Junction, Colorado. The evidence is that the ores
produced under these leases were sold to both rnited
States Yanadium Cmnpany and An1erican Sn1elting and
Refining Con1pany as agent for the A.E.C. Ore shipments began as early as October 1949 (Ps'. Ex. X). The
only evidence of advice relative to the lease agreen1ents
is two letters to A1nerican Smelting & Refining Company
dated December 7, 1949 authorizing deduction of royalties
on ores produced by two of the lessees (D's. Ex. 2, 6).
There is nothing in the record to show any such notifica-
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tion being sent to U.S.V., or to A.S. & R. before December
7, 1949, or that such notices were sent covering other
lessees than those mentioned. Further, there is nothing
in the record to show that these authorizations were
binding on the purchasers so they could not pay over all
the ore proceeds to the producer, and in fact such was
the case (Ps'. Ex. N).
4. On pages 3 and 4, defendant states that in J anuary 1950, defendant entered into a lease arrangement
with E. G. Frawley and that this agreement recited that
conflicts with the Camp Bird claims were without merit.
The January 1950 agreement was a contract of sale and
not a lease. It contained a recital that defendant was uncertain concerning the status and affairs of the Estate,
but on information received he believed the attorney for
the estate by stipulation, without authority and after the
death of A. L. Tomlinson, had tried to dispose of certain
interests in the mining claims (Ps'. Ex. 0).
5. On page 5, defendant states that the stipulation
and agreement of December 15, 1951 provided that because of litigation the royalty money from Consolidated's
operations were to be held in a trust account. On the
contrary, the stipulation and agreement provided that
the trust monies would be distributed to the parties pursuant to that agreement, and in fact, the monies were so
distributed (Ps'. Ex. E; Ps'. Ex. F).
6. On page 6, defendant says that in February of
1953 upon due notice to plaintiffs, the probate court confirmed the Deeds and distributed the property to the de-
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fendant. The probate file shows that the notice of the
hearing was not received by plaintiff Acott or Fuller
(D's. Ex. 18). Further, Mrs. Shockley testified that she
was not living at the address to which the notice was sent
and did not believe she received any such notice (T-1, p.
76). There was nothing in the order of the Court which
confirmed the 1952 Deeds.
7. On page 6, defendant states that plaintiffs had
been dissatisfied with Estate matters since June of 1942
and that this was the reason for the change of administrators in January of 1949. There is nothing in the
record to support this statement.
8. On page 6, defendant states that plaintiffs ·were
demanding that the administrator distribute the estate
property. Defendant's testimony was that they were
discussing how the money could be distributed from the
Bank, and his words ·were that plaintiffs were "wondering
how we could get that money out" (T-1, p. 26S). Defendant further states that the dissatisfaction beca1ne acute
in 1951. There is nothing in the record relative to any
conversations for the distribution of the money prior to
the conversation in the spring of 1952 (T-1, p. 268).
9. On page 6, defendant states that the attorney
for the estate sent a letter to defendant to clarify the
situation as to why the nwney could not be distributed.
Defendant's state1nent adds that the letter was sent to defendant's n1other who showed it to plaintiffs. The testiInony of the plaintiffs was that they had not seen this
letter. Further, the letter (D's. Ex. E) is a report of the
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estate attorney to defendant, the tenor of which would
indicate that as early as June 25, 1951 the estate was
approaching a point at which it could be closed. The suggestion contained in the letter that the distribution of
money be held back relates to a demand of Hansen or
Jensen for an accounting of royalties received by defendant and ascribes this as the only reason for keeping the
estate open. The stipulation and agreement of December
15, 1951 resolved this when the parties agreed to waive
any accounting (Ps'. Ex. F). Defendant's statement goes
on that following this stipulation and agreement, the
case was still undecided and other conflicts were undetermined and for this reason the estate could not be
closed and the distribution made. An examination of the
court files in Civil No. 1713 reveals no claim of any party
pending in June of 1952, wherein any assertion is made
which would require an accounting from the defendant.
Further, defendant actually distributed the estate of
February 10, 1953 and testified that nothing had transpired in Civil No. 1713 between June of 1952, when defendant obtained the deeds and February of 1953, which
made distribution possible on the latter date but not
possible on the June 1952 date (T-1, p. 332).
10. On page 7, defendant states that none of the
adverse claimants in Civil No. 1713 was aware of the
amount of ore removed from the Camp Bird claims by
defendant in 1949 and 1950. There is nothing in the record
to support this statement and it is submitted that the
agreement of December 15, 1951 waiving any claim for
an accounting renders this immaterial.
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11. On page 7, it is stated that plaintiffs and defendant agreed that defendant would assume all expenses relating to the mining claims and would make no claim
against the plaintiffs. The court specifically found this
not to be the fact (Finding of Fact No. 49, R. p. 89).
12. On page 7, defendant states that at the hearing
of the petition for distribution plaintiff Schockley and
Mr. Lawrence Fuller were present in the court room.
Defendant testified that none of the heirs was present at
the hearing on the Decree of Distribution (T-1, p. 279).
Further, there is nothing in the record that Mr. La·wrence
Fuller, husband of plaintiff, was present at the hearing.
13. On page 7, defendant states that all of the plaintiffs testified that after June of 1952 they did not evidence any further interest until April 1954. There is
nothing in the record to support this statement. Plaintiff
A. E. Tomlinson testified that in July 1952 he had a conversation ·with defendant asking about the deeds and
estate matters (T-1, p. 102).
.
195-!
14. On page 8, defendant states that in . .-\pril
plaintiffs received a letter frmn John Lowe, plaintiff's attorney, advising the1n they had an interest in the Te1nple
.Mountain properties and that he could recover it for
the1n. This state1nent is not supported by the record and
is completely contrary to the evidence adduced at the
hearing (T-1, p. 87 to 89; T-1, p. 5:2; T-1, p. ~81; T-1, p.
143; T-1, p. 30; T-1, p. G.f: T-1, p. 84; T-1, p.10±; T-1, p.
139). In view of the inference in this state1nent that Mr.
Lowe is guilty of barratry, counsel as a matter of per-
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sonal privilege advises the court that the following are
the circumstances of how the representation of plaintiffs
came about: An inquiry was received during December
of 1953 from the Fullers and Cisneys relative to the
representation of plaintiffs in attempting to determine
whether or not defendant was acting properly under his
trust. Counsel agreed to represent plaintiffs and wrote a
letter to defendant requesting that he arrange a time for
counsel to review the estate accounts and asking for areconveyance of the claims in view of the fact that all of the
Temple Mountain litigation had been resolved. Defendant
wrote counsel the letter which is plaintiff's exhibit IL
Following receipt of this letter, counsel again wrote defendant to clarify his position and thereafter received a
call from C. Allen Elggren who advised counsel of defendant's position that he did not admit plaintiffs had
any interest in the Temple Mountain properties nor was
he willing to give an accounting to the parties. Following
receipt of this information, and in June 1954, counsel
wrote plaintiffs advising them of defendant's position.
Counsel states that at no time did they solicit to represent plaintiffs in this action.
15. On page 8, defendant states that he assisted
:Jlr. Frawley in locating other claims and relocating existing claims on Temple ~fountain. This statement is not
supported in the record.
16. On page 8, defendant states that in the fall of
1952 ~Ir. Frawley gave defendant shares of stock. The
record shows this stock was given to defendant by Continental :L\Iining and :Milling Company (Ps'. Exh. V).
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17. On page 8, defendant states that the stock was
given by reason of work he had done over a two-year
period. Defendant's testimony was that the stock was
given as compensation for his work as foreman and carpenter during the period from February to June of 1950
(T-1, p. 206-7) and for no other reason (T-1, p. 311).
~fr. Elggren testified defendant was paid for this work,
and that it was not given for this work (T-2, p. 210, 219).
18. On page 9, defendant states that ~Irs. Cisney
testified she signed the 1952 deed believing it was required to enable defendant to enter into a lease. The
testimony of Mrs. Cisney was that she signed the deed
upon defendant's statement that he would hold the property for plaintiffs and divide anything received from it
equally (T-1, p. 14), and that she was trying to cooperate
with defendant (T-1, p. 48).
19. On page 9, defendant states that plaintiffs
stated they did not rely on defendant in executing the
1952 deeds. ·Contrary to this, plaintiffs testifi_ed they
were relying on defendant (T-1, p. 30: T-1. p. 79; T-1.
p. 86; T-1, p. 97; T-1, p. 105: T-1. p. 109; T-1. p. 132).
20. On page 10, defendant states plaintiffs adnritted
the~r were told the estate could not be distributed until
the title and conflicting clain1s were settled. Plaintiff
deny any such adn1issions are contained in the record,
and contend there wa8 no reason for defendant to withhold distribution of the estate in 1952.
21. On page 10, defendant states that during the
trial plaintiffs claimed a privilege as to matters discussed
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with their husbands. No evidence was excluded whatsoever upon a husband-wife privilege.
22. On page 10, defendant states that Mr. Cisney,
who is not a party, testified he knew the claims had been
leased to Consolidated and that defendant had been
promised some stock by Mr. Frawley. Mr. Cisney's testimony was that he was on the property in April of 1950.
(T-2, p. 48). This was before Consolidated carne onto
the property, and was immediately after the 1950 deed
had been given, when Continental had moved onto the
property pursuant to the agreement of January 1950.
The stock which Mr. Cisney referred to in his testimony
was 56,000 shares of stock through Continental (T-2, p.
51). The only place 56,000 shares of stock is mentioned
is in a typographical error in the letter sent by defendant
to each of the plaintiffs asking for the 1950 deeds, which
all of plaintiffs received (P's Exh. C).
23. On page 11, defendant states the only testimony
in the r.ecord as to the value of the claims in 1952 is the
amount of royalty produced on the claims in 1949-50,
which was known to plaintiffs. Defendant testified he
had a sublease on the Camp Bird 12 mining claim and
produced ores giving him $23,000 and that he saw the
extent of Consolidated's operations. From these two
factors, defendant was in a position to have information
upon which an opinion of value could be based, which
should have been conveyed to plaintiffs but was not.
24. On page 12, defendant makes a statement relative to the testimony of Mrs. Lillie Tomlinson, mother
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of the parties. The sum total of Mrs. Tomlinson's testimony reflects that of a very elderly person who has
little or no recollection or understanding whatsoever of
the events that transpired in connection with the deeds.
On cross examination the answers she gave to most of the
questions reflected a parroting of the statements defendant's counsel made in connection with objections to
questions put to her. It is noteworthy that in a deposition
taken by defendant on August 8, 1955, approximately one
month before the trial of the case, and in response to
questions asked her by defendant's counsel, Mrs. Tomlinson testified, with respect to the 1950 deeds, that the
plaintiffs were to have no further interest in the property
after the 1950 deeds ( T -1, p. 199 to 203), even though defendant concedes that in 1950 the deeds were given to
him on an express trust for plaintiffs' benefit. Indicative
of the character of the witness and her testimony is a
statement of the Court during her redirect examination
when plaintiff's counsel objected to a question put to her.
The Court said, "Ordinarily, I would sustain that objection, but bearing in mind the witness, why I will let it
stay." (T-1, p. 241)
25. On page 12, defendant states that evidence in
the accounting offered by plaintiffs discloses the liability
which the estate was subject to on June 2, 1952, and
that since defendant onl~- had a 57o interest in the Camp
Bird claims, the Tomlinson interest in the ores produced
in 1949-50 would a1nount to only $800.00, with the remainder belonging to the other parties to the 19±:2 stipulation. This statement ignores entirely the effect of the
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December 15, 1951 stipulation and agreement whereby
all of the parties he refers to waived any accounting for
ores theretofore produced (P's. Exh. F), and the agreement of Continental Mining and Milling Company of
July 1950, whereby Continental agrees to hold defendant
harmless against all claims for ores produced by defendant prior to May 16, 1950 (P's. Exh. 0).
26. On page 12, defendant states that on June ~'
1952, it was admitted by all plaintiffs that they knew
the Tomlinson interest had been reduced to 5%. This is·
contrary to plaintiff's evidence, which was they did not
lmow of this reduction. (T-1, p. 37; T-1, p. 96; T-1, p.
105; T-1, p. 60; T-1, p.128; T-1, p.140.)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT HOLDS THE MINING PROPERTIES ~CONVEYED TO
HIM BY PLAINTIFFS IN TRUST FOR THE USE AND
BENEFIT OF PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
POINT TWO
THE REQUIREMENT THAT DEFENDANT ACCOUNT
TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THE PROCEEDS DERIVED FROM
THE SHARES OF STOCK RECEIVED BY HIM WAS PROPER.
POINT THREE
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT GUILTY OF LACHES IN ASSERTING THEIR RIGHTS.
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POINT FOUR
THE MATTERS RAISED IN 'THIS ACTION WERE NOT
BEFORE THE PROBATE COURT AND THE DECREE OF
DISTRIBUTION IS NOT RES JUDICA'TA IN THIS ACTION.

CROSS-APPEAL
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT TO ACCOUNT TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR
SHARE OF THE SUM OF $6,273.93 BEING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN $13,603.61 ROYALTIES ACCRUED UNDER VARIOUS LEASES MADE BY DEFENDANT IN 1949
AND 1950 AND $7,329.71 THE AMOUNT SHOWN TO HAVE
BEEN DEPOSITED IN BANK ACCOUNTS BY DEFENDANT.
POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE D::FENDANT TO ACCOUNT TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR
SHARE OF THE SUM OF $6,560.23 BEING THE PROFIT
RECEIVED BY DEFENDANT ON A LEASE FROM CONTINENTAL MINING AND l\IILLING CO:\IPANY AND jOR
CONSOLIDATED URANIU:\I MINES, INC. IN 1950.
POINT THREE
THE COURT ERRED IN A "rARDING PLAINTIFFS
TWELVE TWENTY-FIRS'TS INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY
AND MONEY AS TO WHICH DEFENDANT WAS REQUIRED
TO ACCOUNT RATHER THAN THREE-FOURTHS INTEREST.
POINT FOUR
THE ·COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT A
CREDI'T ON HIS ACCOUNTING FOR THE SUM: OF $525.00
pAID TO K. K. STEFFENSON AND THE SUl\I OF $200.00
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PAID TO C. ALLEN ELGGREN, BOTH FOR ATTORNEYS'
FEES.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL ·COURT THA:T DEFENDANT HOLDS THE MINING PROPERTIES CONVEYED TO
HIM BY PLAINTIFFS IN TRUS'T FOR THE USE AND
BENEFIT OF PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

In his brief appellant contends that the conclusions
and judgment of the trial court that defendant holds the
mning properties received by him in trust for plain.
tiffs must be reversed as a matter of law.
He discussed several propositions in this connection
·which will be discusseq. in the order presented by appellant.
(a) Defendant argues that an express trust and a
constructive trust cannot exist as to the same property
at the same time. Without pursuing the academic considerations raised by this argument, the question may be
resolved simply by an examination of the Conclusions of
the trial court whereby it can readily be seen that this is
not the position taken by the court.
It concluded in paragraphs one and two of the conclusions that an express trust arose under both the 1950
and the 1952 deeds. There can be no question as to the
correctness of the conclusion that the conveyance of the
mining claims under the 1950 deeds was under an express
trust, since this was admitted by defendant (T-1, p. 2-5).
The conclusion that an express trust arose under the 1952
deeds results from the Court finding that in obtaining
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the 1952 deeds defendant declared he would hold the mining properties for the use and benefit of plaintiffs and
in trust for them (Finding Nos. 33, 34). That this finding
was amply supported by the evidence will be discussed
hereafter.
In Conclusion 3, the Court said:
"Because of his fiduciary position as administrator of the Tomlinson Estate, and as trustee
under the 1950 deeds, and because of the trust and
confidence placed in him as plaintiff's brother, defendant owed to plaintiffs and each of them the
duty of dealing with them with absolute fairness.
If defendant, in obtaining the deeds from plaintiffs in June of 1952, intended to acquire their
interests for himself and not in trust for plaintiffs,
he owed them the duty of fully disclosing to them
all material facts known to him which would have
any bearing upon plaintiffs' decision to convey
their interest. Since he failed to disclose the
matter set forth in Finding of Fact No. 37, all of
which are material facts, if he intended to obtain
their interest absolutely and not in trust for plaintiffs, he would have been taking unfair advantage
of plaintiff's trust and confidence in hin1 and in
violation of his fiduciary duties, so that, apart
from any express trust, a constructive trust for
plaintiffs' use and benefit 1could result." (Emphasis added.)
Frmn this it can be readily seen that the Court concluded that there was an express trust, but that even
without the statement of defendant that he would hold
the property in trust for plaintiffs under the evidence
presented to the Court, the transaction ,,-as so unfair
and there was such a lack of disclosure of the material
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facts which defendant was under a duty to disclose, that
a constructive trust would result from the transaction.
It is well settled in the law that whenever a fiduciary
attempts to obtain the property in his trust from the
beneficiary, he must disclose to the beneficiaries all the
material facts which he knows or should know, must not
use the influence of his position to induce the consent of
the beneficiary, and the transaction must be in all respects fair and reasonable. 2 Scott on Trusts, Sec. 170.25,
p. 909 ; Sec. 170, p. 856.
(b) Appellant next argues that respondents did
not in fact have trust and confidence in defendant, and
claims they were negligent in not checking up on their
brother. This is contrary to Finding of Fact Nos. 34 and
44, and the evidence of plaintiffs. Further, it ignores the
duties imposed as a matter of law upon persons acting
in fiduciary capacities which regulate their conduct. It is
submitted that a more rigid fiduciary duty than that
which appellant had to respondents is hard to imagine.
It flows from three separate and distinct sources: (1)
Defendant's duty as administrator of the Tomlinson
Estate; ( 2) Defendant's duties as trustee under the
express trust created at the time the 1950 deeds were
obtained, and (3) the duties arising from the confidential
relationship existing between members of a family.
Indicative of the duty which defendant owed plaintiffs arising out of these fiduciary relationships is the
statement of Justice Cardozo in the case of Meinhard
v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 62 A.L.R. 1,
quoted in 2 Scott on Trusts, p. 909, where he said:
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"Many forms of conduct permissible in a
workaday world for those acting at arm's length,
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this there
has developed a tradition that is unending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the
attitudes of courts of equity when petitioned to
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions.
Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by
the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by
any judgment of this court."
Defendant's argument as to the fiduciary relationship appears to lack only the words "caveat emptor" in
being a complete renunciation of the fundamental duties
of a fiduciary. His argument proceeds frmu a premise
which is contrary to the findings of fact of the trial court
relative to plaintiffs' reliance upon defendant, and then
continues that the lack of knowledge of plaintiffs "\'las
due to their negligence. The argun1ent ignores the fact
that even defendant's testin1ony did not demonstrate that
he had disclosed to plaintiffs that he had been getting
money on side deals frmn the lessees, that he had 1nade
substantial sun1s of 1noney subleasing the property from
Continental, that Continental \nls giYing hi1n $23,000
worth of 8tock, that he had passed on to the1n what infonnation he had upon which an opinion of the value of
the elaims could be based testif~-ing that he told then1 the
value couldn't be detennined. He n1isrepresented to them
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that the money in the estate might have to be given back
because of the Migliaccio group's assertions in the lawsuit. From defendant's own testimony, if it were believed in its entirety, there would be established a case
for the imposition of a constructive trust arising out
of defendant's fiduciary duties.
(c) In his third proposition, appellant argues that
the character of plaintiff's evidence is such as requires
a reversal of the trial court's ruling.
He argues that plaintiffs had a burden of proving its
case by clear and convincing evidence, supposing that the
problem is one of establishing defendant's fraud. Rather
than the plaintiffs having to prove their case by clear
and convincing evidence, the burden of proof is upon the
defendant to establish the adequacy of the consideration
for the purchase and the fairness of the transaction.
In 33 C.J.S. 1283, Executors and Administrators,
Sec. 268 ( 2) relative to purchases by executors or administrators from heirs, it is said that the court should
"strongly presume against the validity of such a purchase and require the fiduciary to show affirmatively
adequacy of consideration and the general fairness of the
transaction".
In Ehrengren v. Gronlund, 19 Utah 411, 57 Pac.
268, p. 270, this Court quoted from Jones v. Lloyd, 117
Ill. 597, 7 N.E. 119, as follows:
"Where a trustee sets up a bargain with his
cestui que trust, or a release from him, the burden
of proof is upon the former to vindicate the transaction from any shadow of suspicion, and to show
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that it was perfectly fair and reasonable in every
respect.''
In Burns v. Skogstad, Idaho, 206 Pac. 2d 765 at 769,
in a case remarkably close to the case at bar, the Court
said:
"* * * it was the duty of the executor in
dealing with these legatees to make a full discosure of all relevent facts and to treat them with
utmost frankness. 3 Bogart Trusts and Trustees,
Sec. 493 and 544. The burden was upon the defendants to show that this duty was performed.
This the defendants have not done. The record
is silent as to what disclosures, in any, were made
by the executor as to the condition, or value of
the estate, or as to the interests of the legatees
therein.''
Defendant in his brief cites a comment of the trial
judge relative to the burden of proof, and says t:1i:' -wa'
made in his oral decision. Respondents submit that appellant has taken this statement out of context. The comment was made during an oral discussion between the
court and counsel at the second hearing, some eighteen
months after the initial hearing, as the Court was refreshing its recollection as to what defendant should
account for. It had nothing to do "\Yith the clarity or convincingness of the proof of establishing a trust.
Respondents contend that they haYe n1ore than carried any burden of proof they Inight haYe had in establishing the existance of an express trust arising out of
the 1952 deeds, and that defendant did not sustain his
burden of proof that the transaction was con1pletely fair
and 1nade after a full disclosure of all n1aterial facts.
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(d) Although defendant does not argue that the
evidence presented at the hearing does not support the
findings of fact of the trial court, and in fact ignores
entirely that the court made any findings of fact, he does
argue the matter of the weight which should be given to
plaintiffs' evidence. He categorically states that plaintiffs were advised as to all rna terial facts except the value
of the interest in the claims and the title situation without
explaining upon what he bases this statement. The Court
found that the disclosure of a large number of material
facts was not made by defendant prior to obtaining the
1952 deeds (Finding No. 37). This finding was consistent
with the testimony and· evidence offered by plaintiffs.
Counsel for defendant at the trial stipulated that plaintiff Cisney didn't know anything about the matters
(T-1, p. 20) but in his brief argues that she did know of
all material facts save the two mentioned.
It is well settled that although this court on appeal
will review the evidence, it will not disturb the findings
of the trial court unless they are against the weight of
the evidence. Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 U. 155, 239 P. 2d 745.
(e) Defendant argues that although there need not
be consideration for the 1952 deeds to be effective, in fact
there was consideration because defendant agreed to protect the plaintiffs from any judgment or demand and to
repay any funds ordered repaid by the Court, and to
bear all expenses of the estate. Finding of Fact No. 45,
which is supported by the Record of Civil No. 1713, shows
no adverse claims were ever asserted against defendant.
Finding No. 49 which is supported by the evidence, shows
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that defendant did not agree with plaintiffs to assume
the costs and expenses of the pro bate of the estate, nor
agree to repay any funds. If defendant had undertaken
these things as he contends, he would have been under
the additional duty to tell the heirs that the 1951 stipulation and agreement in Civil No. 1713 had waived any
claim for accountings (Ps'. Exh. F) and that Continental
Mining and Milling Company had agreed to pay the expenses, and to hold them harmless from any demands
for ores removed from the claims (Ps'. Exh. 0.). As set
forth above, the question is not whether there was consideration, but whether the fiduciary has vindicated a
self dealing transaction "from any shadow of suspicion"
and shown that "it was perfectly fair and reasonable in
every respect.'' Ehrengren v. Gronlund, 19 {itah 411,
57 Pac. 268.
(f) Defendant argues that the statute of frauds
prohibits the creation of an express trust. The statute of
frauds is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded.
It ''yas not pleaded and was therefore ,,-ai\ed. Rule S(c)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, when the parties
are in a confidential relationship to one another, the
courts will enforce an oral promise to hold property in
trust even in the absence of fraud on the part of the
promi8or. 1 Scott on Tntsfs, Sec. 442. p. 322.
POINT TWO
'THE REQUIREl\IENT THAT DEFENDANT ACCOUNT
TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THE PROCEEDS DERIVED FROM
THE SHARES OF STOCK RECEIVED BY HIM WAS PROPER.
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Defendant argues that a trust cannot be iinposed on
property which is not a part of the estate and which was
not in existance at the time the trust was created. His
argument relates to the court's order requiring defendant
to account to plaintiff's for the proceeds derived by defendant on the sale of the 32,500 shares of stock received
·by defendant from Continental Mining and Milling company.
The trial court held that the stock was received by
defendant as a result of his dealings with the mining
property, and was in lieu of the 65,000 shares of stock
which defendant was to receive under the January 1950
agreements. The court did not hold that a trust existed
over the stock itself. Rather it held that defendant was
trustee of the mining properties, and must account to
plaintiffs for all things derived therefrom. This in essence is a holding that the income and profits derived
from trust assets must be accounted for by a trustee.
Just as appellant argues, there must be a trust res
in order for a trust to exist. In this case, the trust res
consisted of the mining properties. It is obvious that there
is no rule of law that income or accretions from the trust
res must be in existence at the time the trust is created
in order to be a part of the trust. In this case, defendant
might just as well argue that he is not accountable for
the royalties derived from the mining claims since they
were not in existence at the time of the creation of the
trust.
See 2 Scott on Trusts, Sec. 203, p.1093, quoted below.
There is no issue as to whether or not the stock was
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given as a result of defendant's dealing with the mining
property. By his answer defendant admitted this was the
case (R. 16; 24) and the Court so found.
POINT THREE
PLAINTIFF ARE NOT GUILTY OF LACHES IN ASSERTING THEIR RIGHTS.

Defendant argues that plaintiffs are barred by
laches. This defense was not raised by defendant in the
court below and for this reason cannot be presented to
the court on appeal for the first time. Further, laches
is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded. Rule
8 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The evidence at the hearing discloses that plaintiffs
did not delay in filing suit. It was not until June of 1954
that plaintiffs learned defendant was not recognizing the
trust (T-1, pp. 30, 64, 84, 104, 139). Suit was commenced
September 24, 1954.
2 Scott on Trusts, Sec. 219.2 states:
"A beneficiarY is not barred bY laches from
holding a trustee ·liable for breach ·of trust if he
did not know or have reason to know of the breach
of trust.''
Defendant had 1nade a payn1ent to plaintiffs as late
as November 31, 1953, and they would hav-e no reason
to know of an~, breach of trust prior to that tilne.
Defendant does not show a change of position, hi:3
argun1ent boiling down to the state1nent that plaintiffs
were "negligent'' in trusting defendant. This suit is
evidenre of the fact that they should not have trusted
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their brother, but this is certainly not a basis for applying
the doctrine of laches.
POINT FOUR
THE MATTERS RAISED IN THIS ACTION WERE NOT
BEFORE THE PROBATE COURT AND THE DECREE OF
DISTRIBUTION IS NOT RES JUDICA TA IN THIS ACTION.
1

1

Defendant argues that the probate decree in the
Tomlinson estate is res judicata and determinative of th8
rights of the parties in this action. Judge Keller was
sitting as the trial judge in this action and was the probate judge in the Tomlinson estate matter.
In his findings in this case he ruled, and we submit
correctly so, that all the probate decree did was to pass
legal title from the deceased to the grantee of all of the
heirs. He said :
"There was nothing in these probate proceedings which would make plaintiffs aware of
any contention on the part of the defendant as
to the equitable ownership of the claims, but they
would be aware only that defendant was having
distributed to him the legal title to the claims in
the estate."
He ruled further that the matter and things contained in plaintiff's complaint and amended complaint
were not before the court on that hearing and plaintiffs
were not aware of any contention of defendant relative
to his owning the equitable title until after the decree was
entered in the probate proceedings and after the distribution of monies to them by defendant in December of
1953.
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Both the 1950 and 1952 deeds were given to defendant so that he could handle the property unfettered by
the problems of joint ownership. To have the distribution made to himself as grantee under the deeds was
certainly a material requirement of this design, in that
without this he could not negotiate with the property
without getting confirmation of the probate court since
the legal title to the property would be in the decedenfs
name.
The probate record shows that all of plaintiffs were
nonresidents at the time the decree was entered. It further shows affirmatively that some of plaintiffs did not
receive notice of the hearing on the decree. None of them
was present in the court at the time the matter was
heard. But even if they had received notice and all been
in the court they would not have raised any objection
to the distribution of the legal title to defendant because
that would be the very thing that plaintiffs as well as
defendant would want done.
It is submitted that the issues which are presented
to the Court by this case, ·which deal entirely with the
equitable title to the property, in seeking to ha-Ye the
court impose and enforce a trust were outside the purvie"· of the probate proceeding. See JfcContb Y. Friuk,
149 U. S. (}:2D, 37 L. Ed. S7G. "\Yherein the court, in holding
the doctrine of re~ judicata is applicable as to only those
matters "·hich are in issue in the case. discusses the inapplicabilit~· of a judg1nent in an action at law to an
action in equit~·.
r:l1his ea~c i~ one in equit~· to iinpose and enforce a
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trust upon property the legal title to which is unquestionably in defendant not only by reason of the probate decree but also the deeds given by plaintiffs. It is submitted
this case does not represent a collateral attack on the
decree of the probate court, since its purpose is in no
way designed to interfere with that decree.
In two recent Utah cases, this Court has imposed
a trust upon property the legal title to which has passed
through probate proceedings. These are: Peterson v.
Peterson, 105 Utah 133, 141 P. 2d 882, and Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 225, 209 Pac. 2d 235.
The latter case involved a mother who conveyed
property to her daughter in fee, orally expressing the
intention that the daughter should hold it for all of the
mother's heirs. The mother died and then the daughter
died. The daughter's husband probated the daughter's
estate and obtained a decree of distribution to himself.
The other heirs of the mother sued the distributee to impose a trust on the property, the legal title to which he
had acquired through the probate decree. This Court
imposed a trust saying:

"*** But the plaintiffs urge that since the
probate division of the court had decreed legal
title to the entire property to be in the defendant,
the subsequent decree made by the court below
was necessary to nullify the original decree. In
order that the defendant's interest in the property
be protected, the lower court's decree ordering the
defendant to convey the property to Verba Haws
who should hold the property as trustee for the
use and benefit of the heirs at law of Mrs. Haws
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is modified [to protect defendant's interest as an
heir]."
Defendant cites several cases to support his position,
most of which are not in point in that they did not involve
trusts, so the distinction between the effect of the judgment or decree upon the equitable title is not involved.
The only case cited by defendant which involves a
trust is Weyant v. Utah Savings & Trust Company, 54
Utah 818, 182 Pac. 189, and in that case the court imposed
a trust upon the property which the probate court had
distributed, and it therefore lends support to the position
of plaintiffs rather than defendant.
The case of Edson v. Bartow, 154 N.Y. 199, 48 N.
E. 541, 61 Am. St. Rep. 609 was one in which a judgment
in an action to construe a will determining that bequests
to the executors vested in them, as individuals, absolute
ownership of property unaffected by any trust was held
not to bar an action against the individual executors
seeking to impress upon the property in their hands, as
legatees, a trust for the benefit of the next of kin by virtue of circumstances extrinsic to the will.
The case of Meade v. Vande v·orrde, 139 Neb. 827,
299 N. W. 175, held that a timely action in equity by heirs
to declare a trust on personal property still in possession
of the ad1ninistrator, ·who at a grossly inadequate price
sold same to hin1self at his own sale without notice to the
heirs is proper}~~ brought even though the ad1ninistrator's
final arrount wa~ approved b~~ the court and no appeal
wn~ taken.

Stratrs v. Dimotsis, CCA 5th, 1940, 110 F. 2d 3i4:,
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cert. den. 311 U.S. 666, was a case in which property was
sold by an administrator, who then proceeded to close
the estate and then bought the property. A judgment for
the heirs to impress a trust on the property was affirmed.
The court found no merit in a contention that the proceedings constituted a collateral attack on the judgment
and orders of the probate court, and pointed out that the
action was not to attack the orders and judgment of the
probate court, or to set aside or invalidate the sale made
under its authority, but to impress a trust upon the property.
Defendant having promised to hold the claims in
trust, and having given no indication to plaintiffs that he
was doing otherwise prior to June of 1954 gives answer
to appellant's arguments that plaintiff's should have
appeared to object to the decree of distribution. Until
such time as they were made aware of defendant's contention that he held both the legal and equitable title,
there was no reason for them to attempt any action.
CROSS APPEAL
POINT ONE
'THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT TO ACCOUNT TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR
SHARE OF THE SUM OF $6,273.93 BEING THE DIFFER_
ENCE BETWEEN $13,603.61 ROYALTIES ACCRUED UNDER VARIOUS LEASES MADE BY DEFENDANT IN 1949
AND 1950 AND $7,329.71 'THE AMOUNT SHOWN TO HAVE
BEEN DEPOSITED IN BANK ACCOUNTS BY DEFENDANT.
1

Defendant is accountable for all royalties payable
in the absence of proof that with the exercise of due
diligence the same would not be collectible.
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The Court in Finding of Fact No. 10 found as follows:
"10. These Lessees produced and sold ores
from the Camp Bird Mining Claims during 1949
and 1950, and Defendant received and deposited
in special bank accounts the sum of $7,329.71 from
this production. The royalties which accrued under these shipments and those of Continental
Mining & Milling Company, as hereinafter set out,
amounted to $13,603.64. The evidence does not
support a finding that Defendant actually received more than the $7,329. 71. Defendant did not
obtain any accountings from any of the lessees nor
take any steps to attempt the collection of any
other royalties than those paid to him nor to
verify the amount of royalties due."
2 Scott on Trusts, paragraph 177 sets forth the following propositions of law:
"177. Duty to enforce claims. A trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to take reasonable
steps to realize on claims which he holds in trust.
If he fails to take such steps as are reasonable
he is subject to a surcharge for such loss as results from his failure to act* "' "' The trustee i~
subject to a surcharge where he fails to take proper steps to collect rent due from a tenant."' "' "'
If a debtor fails to pay a debt due to the
estate, it is ordinarily the duty of the trustee to
bring an action to enforce payn1ent. * * "' If the
trustee has made no effort to collect the claim.
however, the burden is upon him to show that
such effort would have been unavailing.··

In addition, interest thereon should be awarded.
2 Scott on Tntsts, paragraph 207.
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POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT 'TO ACCOUNT TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR
SHARE OF THE SUM OF $6,560.23 BEING THE PROFIT
RECEIVED BY DEFENDANT ON A LEASE FROM CONTINENTAL MINING AND MILLING COMPANY ANDjOR
CONSOLIDATED URANIUM MINES, INC. IN 1950.

The obtaining of the sublease from Continental
& ~Iilling Co. and/or Consolidated Uranium
~Iines, Inc. amounted to self dealing by defendant as
trustee with the trust property.
~lining

Finding of Fact No. 29 is as follows:
"29. Defendant obtained a lease of certain of
the Camp Bird mining claims from Continental
Mining and Milling Company andjor Consolidated
Uranium Mines, Inc., and mined the same during
1950. Under said lease Defendant received the
sum of $23,804.40 for ores produced therefron1
and incurred expenses in producing said ore'S
amounting to $17,244.17."
:2 Scott on Trusts, Sec. 203 provides in part as fol-

lows:
"A trustee who makes a profit through a
breach of trust is accountable to the beneficiaries
for the profit. Even though the profit is not made
through a breach of trust, however, the trustee is
accountable for it if it was made in the administration of the trust. Thus where a trustee deposits trust funds in a bank and receives interest
on the deposit, he is accountable for the interest
received even though he was not under a duty
to make the money productive. The trustee is
accountable for any profit 1nade on the purchase
and sale of trust securities or for any profjt
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made through the use of the trust property,
whether he uses it himself or receives payment
from a third person for the privilege of using
it. Similarly, if he receives a commission or bonm;
he is accountable for it even if he does not commit a breach of trust in receiving it.''
Respondents contend that this profit derived from
the mining of the Camp Bird Claim No. 12, during 1950,
while defendant was acting as trustee of the mining
claims, should be included in defendant's accounting.
When the opportunity arose for obtaining a sublease
of the mining claim, it was defendant's duty as trustee
to obtain this sublease for and on behalf of the beneficiaries of the trust, and he is therefore accountable for
the profit derived therefrom.
POINT THREE
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFFS
TWELVE TWENTY-FIRS'TS INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY
AND MONEY AS TO WHICH DEFENDANT WAS REQUIRED
TO ACCOUNT RATHER THAN THREE-FOURTHS IN'TEREST.

'Vhen defendant obtained the deeds frmn plaintiffs,
he declared that he would hold the property thereby acquired in trust for the heirs of A. L. Tomlinson in equal
shares (T-1, pgs. 1-t 30, 31. +±. -±7). There were in all
eight heir~. so that each would be entitled to one-eighth
interest. Plaintiffs constitute six of the heirs. and should
therefore be entitled to three-fourths interest. The Court
nwarded the1n a twPlYe twt>nty-firsts interest.
Throughout the Tmnlinson dealings this equal division had been the arrange1nent which all of the parties
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had agreed to. In making the distribution of the estate
monies, defendant distributed the monies equally among
all of the heirs, and he testified that the agreement of
the parties had been that the division was to be equal
among all the heirs (T-1, p. 286).
The testimony of plaintiffs, supported as it is by
the conduct of the parties in handling the estate affairs
on an equal basis among all the heirs, is indicative that
the trust was for each heir to have an equal share, and
the trial court should have made the award consistent
with this agreement.
POINT FOUR
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT A
CREDI'T ON HIS ACCOUNTING FOR THE SUM OF $525.00
PAID TO K. K. STEFFENSON AND THE SUM OF $200.00
PAID TO C. ALLEN ELGGREN, BOTH FOR ATTORNEYS'
FEES.

Continental Mining and Milling Company agreed
to pay 'an of defendant's expenses in connection with
legal work for the Estate or claims for legal work asserted against the Estate (P's. E:xh. 0) and defendant made
no effort to have Continental Mining and Milling Company pay the same or to obtain reimbursement from
said Company.
Finding of Fact No. 17 is as follows :
"17. There is no evidence sufficient to base
a finding that Continental Mining and Milling
·Company paid any royalty monies to defendant
pursuant to the January 22, 1950 agreement nor
that they reimbursed him for expenses incurred
by him in obtaining counsel to handle the affairs
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of the estate or establishing title to the Camp
Bird Mining Claims. Defendant incurred expenses
in the amount of $525.00 to K. K. Steffenson in
connection with the title suit and $200.00 to C.
Allen Elggren, secretary of Continental Mining
and Milling Company, for handling the probate
proceedings of the Estate. Defendant made no
effort to collect any royalties from Continental
Mining and Milling Company nor to obtain reimbursement of the said expenses from that Company."
As set forth under POINT ONE a surcharge should
be made against a trustee who fails to take such steps
as are reasonable to realize on claim. 2 8 cott on Trusts,
paragraph 207.
It is noteworthy that ·C. Allen Elggren, to whom
$200.00 was paid was Secretary of the company which
had agreed to furnish the legal fees, and defendant
should have refrained from paying him in accordance
with the Continental agreement, Plaintiff's Exhibit 0.
CONCLUSION
Much of this brief has been devoted to the contentions argued by appellant relative to a constructive trust.
It is emphasized however, that the Trial Court found on
the evidence adduced at the hearing that in receiving both
the 1950 and 195:2 deeds defendant agreed to hold the
Inining propert~T for plaintiffs' use and benefit, and that
defendant holds the properties under an express trust.
This finding was supported by the evidence and should
be affirmed.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

49
The considerations of whether or not the facts would
support the imposition of a constructive trust for plaintiff's use and benefit due to the unfairness of the transaction and the non-disclosure and misrepresentation of
material facts by defendant is therefore largely of academic importance in this case. If the trial court's finding
of an express trust is correct, and we submit it is, there
is no need to further consider the question of whether
or not the facts would warrant the imposition of a constructive trust in the absence of such an express promise.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE and
THOMAS C. CUTHBERT
Attorneys for Respondents
1001 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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